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Abstract
Long-term preservation of and access to business records of the 
sort that business historians have relied upon for decades and that 
supported the development of applied fields, like business strategy, 
is increasingly threatened by their growing value. The expansion of 
entrepreneurial capitalism following the end of the Cold War has 
produced a new era of business ascendant across much of the globe. 
At home, we are reminded of President Calvin Coolidge’s observa-
tion that “the chief business of the American people is business.” Not 
since Coolidge first uttered these words more than eighty years ago 
have they rung more true. And if the business of America is business, 
then surely the history of America is the history of American business. 
Yet, if we have witnessed a new gilded age in American industry, the 
evidentiary record of these events may disappoint future scholars, 
policy makers, and the interested public.
The article is organized as follows: first, the problem is described. The sec-
tion “Record of Business at Risk” explores these factors. The next section, 
“The Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era” reviews some of 
the efforts that have been supported by the National Digital Information 
Infrastructure Preservation Program (NDIIPP) of the Library of Congress 
to develop the outlines of an effective response, including summaries of 
the major digital preservation projects in which I have participated. The 
conclusion describes possible future scenarios and the policy contexts 
that might determine eventual outcomes.
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The Record of Business at Risk
Why are business records more at risk now than in the past? Information 
technology is implicated at every step, but technological change is not the 
only cause of the threat. The sources of the problem include entrepre-
neurship, litigiousness, and shareholder capitalism itself, each of which 
are indirectly affected by changes in the underlying technological land-
scape.
Increasing interest in and pursuit of entrepreneurship will lead to de-
creasing persistence of business records. The rise of entrepreneurship 
and its growing importance to the future of the American economy is 
well	documented	(Schramm,	2006;	Baumol,	Litan,	and	Schramm,	2007).	
As one indication of this trend, Shane (2003) reports that there are more 
businesses created in the United States than marriages. Even accounting 
for the supposed “Dot Com Bust” in the early part of the decade, Metrick 
(2007) notes that outlays by U.S. venture capitalist funds have increased 
approximately tenfold from 1991 to 2002 when twenty billion dollars was 
invested in venture capital-backed companies. Entrepreneurial ventures 
are, by definition, created de novo. At inception, no basic practices are 
inscribed in the firm, and such organizations are said by Stinchecombe to 
suffer from a “liability of newness” (1965). Records management is merely 
one of a variety of practices that are lacking in a new venture, and only if 
the venture survives and grows to maturity is the firm likely to develop poli-
cies in this area. Lacking formal research on this issue, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that records management is very far down the list of priorities 
of new entrepreneurs, and with good reason. The search for financing, 
customers, suppliers, employees, and, above all, profits, must come first. 
However, entrepreneurship research has shown that most new ventures 
fail within their first several years of existence (Shane, 2008), likely well be-
fore records management practices have been established. Little is known 
about the fate of the records of failed startups in general, but based upon 
the general research on business plans described later, many new ventures 
disappear without a trace. Within the subset of business plans we were able 
to preserve in the Business Plan Archive (http://www.businessplanarchive 
.org), there was a significant fraction for which we were unable to find any 
other record, digital or otherwise, beyond the business plan: there were 
no stored pages in the Wayback Machine (www.archive.org), no identifi-
able public records, and no mention of the firm in searchable media. 
And even firms that introduced important innovations before ultimately 
failing (and will therefore leave a small historical footprint) may warrant 
additional preservation efforts. For the moment, the recent increase in 
entrepreneurship has not been accompanied by a concomitant increase 
in resources dedicated to the preservation of the records of these firms.
The rise of shareholder capitalism also portends the loss of business re-
cords. At first pass, one may wonder how the shareholder revolution and 
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the persistence of business records are connected, but the relationship is 
straightforward and revolves around the existence of “a public interest in 
private records.” Following the model of a traditional business archive like 
the Hagley Museum in Delaware or the Baker Library at Harvard, scholars 
would access business records that had been discarded or deaccessioned 
by the original records producers (General Motors, DuPont, etc.). To the 
extent that records from these individual businesses were used to produce 
generalizable findings about the workings of business, scholars extracted 
residual public value from private records. The original owners of the re-
cords—that is, the shareholders of General Motors and DuPont—did not 
receive compensation for the full value that their records created. In fact, 
it is quite likely that the shareholders were not even aware that private re-
cords were being put to a public purpose. Often the transfer of traditional 
records occurred decades after their production when corporate records 
managers and business archivists would agree to deaccession collections 
that had, by then, acquired evident historic value. In this traditional model, 
paper business records were inadvertently or accidentally preserved inter 
alia within the confines of the producing organization and then handed 
over to independent archivists when it became clear that a public interest ex-
isted and outweighed any residual private value inhering in the documents. 
The shareholder revolution, heralded as an essential advance for common 
stockholders, lays bare the contradiction inherent in the traditional model. 
If a proposed action does not directly benefit shareholders, then it should 
not be supported by responsible management. Because the private benefits 
of contributing to an archive are questionable at best, we can expect that 
in the future fewer organizations will donate business records.
Finally, American litigiousness also plays an important part in this 
saga. The costs of saving business records come in two flavors. The first 
is plain vanilla and includes such predictable expenses as storage, cura-
tion, and migration (for digital formats). To borrow from Harry Potter, 
these costs—while not inconsequential—pale in comparison to the Bertie 
Botts of legal liability that are mixed into the vanilla. The costs associated 
with these surprises are unknown and therefore especially frightening to 
a corporate world desperate to predict and thereby control every aspect of 
economic activity taking place within the boundaries of the firm. From a 
statistical viewpoint, reasonable observers agree that the liability risk asso-
ciated with any given record is vanishingly small. However, if a corporation 
did something wrong, inadvertently or otherwise, and the act was docu-
mented in a surviving business record, there might exist a ticking time 
bomb of legal liability, a toe jam flavored Bertie Bott Any-Flavor Bean bur-
ied in the Record of Business. If such a record exists, we know four things. 
First, its existence and contents would be of great interest to aggrieved 
parties, potentially including the government. Second, the cost of scour-
ing the Record of Business to find the specific offending record would 
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be high. Third, were the firm to know of the existence of such a record, 
that fact would compel the firm to disclose the wrongdoing or compound 
its crime by concealing or actively destroying a business record known to 
be sought in discovery. Fourth, historians and other scholars would also 
have an interest in knowing of the existence and contents of the record, as 
part of the landscape of facts onto which historical agency is mapped. For 
almost any conceivable constellation of facts, the potential private costs 
associated with factors one through three swamp any potential public ben-
efit that might arise from factor four. The benefit accrues to society in the 
form of hard-to-measure historical, cultural knowledge, while the costs—
potential and real—are incurred entirely by the firm and its shareholders. 
Under these circumstances what results is a set of policies that have come 
to be known as document retention policies, policies that define different 
categories of records and how long each document type is expected to be 
preserved. Even proponents of these policies admit this is a misnomer if 
ever there was one. The reality is that document retention policies dictate 
timetables for records destruction, and their sweeping scope and breadth 
insure that the company cannot be charged with arbitrarily seeking to 
destroy any specific record or conceal any specific act. The specific treat-
ment of, say, employment records relative to tax records, or administrative 
records relative to accounting records, will vary from firm to firm and 
state to state. But their purpose is clear: every record produced within the 
boundaries of the organization should be saved until a certain date and 
then destroyed. These policies are the proximate causes of the threat to 
the Record of Business.
Far from criticizing any firm or individual for implementing document 
destruction policies of the type described above, I marvel that corporate 
America has been so slow to adopt them. For decades, scholars benefited 
from the fact that organizations did not really know what was happening 
to their records. The Record of Business is the repository of organizational 
memory, the seat from which all-important organizational knowledge is 
managed. Though no one in a position of authority wishes ill to history, 
neither can a decision to spend scarce resources for the benefit of a non-
shareholder be squared with fiduciary requirements. Because history is 
not a recognized shareholder, there is no mechanism by which the inter-
ests of history can be factored into firm-level decision making. History, 
like Tennessee Williams’ Blanche DuBois, has always depended upon the 
kindness of strangers. Unfortunately, such kindness must now take place 
in broad daylight and in full view of the shareholders whose checkbooks 
pay the costs. Today, the CEO, general counsel, or other corporate officer 
who fails to destroy records the moment after they cease to be worth more 
to the corporation than they cost to maintain (or one moment longer 
than set forth in the company’s document retention schedule) will be 
doing so in explicit violation of that officer’s fiduciary obligation to share-
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holders and should be replaced with someone who will. Business records 
have survived by a wink-and-a-nod arrangement. Firms maintained their 
records during the initial, primary-use phase of the information lifecycle, 
and then variously retained them under more or less active managerial 
regimes.	Some	eventually	made	their	way	into	an	archive;	others	did	not.	
Serendipity determined the fate of any given item. The effect of the forces 
described above is that this informal equilibrium is no longer stable. The 
checks that had previously moderated the risk to business records are be-
ing eroded, and the emerging records management regime will ruthlessly 
reward firms for leaving nothing to future scholars.
Each of these factors—entrepreneurship, shareholder capitalism, 
and the culture of litigiousness—is clearly connected to the transformed 
technological landscape. Information technology has both created entre-
preneurial opportunities and reshaped the processes of economic coordi-
nation by which such opportunities are exploited (Lamoreaux, Raff, and 
Temin, 2003). From Web casts of quarterly earnings reports and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR online database to the 
rise of the Motley Fool and online stock trading, shareholders have more 
access to information about how firms deploy resources than ever before, 
thereby furthering the advance of the shareholder revolution. And tech-
nology has increased the efficiency with which all professional services are 
provided, even the plaintiff’s bar.
But technological change contributes to the problem in other ways. 
The digital revolution has raised the stakes, increasing the value of effec-
tive records management (a.k.a. knowledge management) and extending 
the primary-use phase of the information lifecycle, while simultaneously 
drawing attention to the risks associated with records that outlive their 
value to the firm. In the sanitized parlance of contemporary techno-uto-
pia, “friction free” capitalism will no longer leave a trail of dust and crumbs 
for future generations to interpret. Instead the frictions and inefficiencies 
that produced these traces will be obviated, the incidental copies tracked 
along with every other valued economic output and eventually destroyed. 
Digitization simply lays bare the contradictions that allowed the Record of 
Business to be preserved in the past. The fact that a single sheet of paper 
attesting to a potentially embarrassing event committed by a wayward firm 
has ever survived is testament to the failure of corporate records manag-
ers to efficiently manage the archived burden of past generations. With 
paper—where the default preservation setting is, in the medium term, 
retain—the Record of Business survived until it was lost, lost to the re-
cords managers that supervised it, lost to the office clerks that ignored 
the “save until” date on the paper file, lost to the CEO who could not be 
bothered with worrying about fiduciary obligations extending down to 
the file room. For every record that was “lost” to the corporation, there 
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was a non-zero statistical probability that the record would be “found” for 
history, appearing at some future date in a curated, archival collection. 
Without a numerical estimate of that probability, I propose that the effect 
of	digitization	 is	 to	 reduce	 it	 by	 several	 orders	 of	magnitude;	 thus,	 the	
Record of Business that will be lost to business and found to history will 
be vanishingly small for the very reason that the technology which made 
the knowledge encoded in the record valuable enables its corporate cre-
ators to track its progress through the administrative digestive tract of the 
firm. The fact that instances of information loss have posed such visible 
and costly challenges to corporations and other organizations (see, for 
instance, Fidelity Investments [Wong, 2006], the U.S. Veterans Adminis-
tration (Greenemeier, 2006), and AOL (Hafner, 2006)) underscores the 
value attached to records of business, and items of value will not be mis-
placed, lost, or otherwise overlooked.
Thus, we can now state the problem with some clarity: In the past, busi-
ness records survived inadvertently. The digital revolution, consistent with 
changes in the structure of the economy and the clearest dictates of share-
holder capitalism, will destroy the Record of Business not by accident, but 
on purpose by making it manageable and valuable for a discrete, but lim-
ited period of time beyond which its value to the corporation falls below 
the cost to maintain it. On that day the Record of Business will be erased.
The Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era
This section describes the efforts that we have undertaken, in partnership 
with the Library of Congress, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and other 
NDIIPP participants, to address the issues identified above. Believing that 
the recent past offered both a fertile moment in the history of business 
and a bonanza of potentially valuable “at risk” digital business records, 
we focused our efforts on the creation of a new repository, the Digital 
Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era (hereafter shortened to the Dot 
Com Archive or DCA). Established in June 2002 in the depths of the post-
bubble technology recession, the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot 
Com Era set out to identify, collect, and preserve a representative collec-
tion of born-digital business records and related digital ephemera from 
companies that sought to exploit the commercialization of the Internet 
during the 1990s. The DCA includes several distinct yet overlapping col-
lections intended to provide future scholars a broad, representative pic-
ture of technology entrepreneurship in the Dot Com Era. It also includes 
several company-specific collections that will allow scholars to immerse 
themselves in the messy details of individual technology ventures. In ad-
dition to describing the collections, we include summaries of initial re-
search findings, accounts of the processes by which the collections came 
into the DCA, and some of the challenges attendant thereto.
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Business Plan Archive
The Business Plan Archive (BPA) was the first effort in this area and con-
tains business planning documents and information from more than three 
thousand Dot Com Era-technology companies. The Business Plan Archive 
accepts contributions from individuals and organizations, both through the 
website and by traditional means. In general the collection is organized by 
firm. Research establishing the overall size of the target population sug-
gests that the BPA will likely constitute the largest such collection from this 
period	(Kirsch,	2007;	Kirsch	&	Goldfarb,	2008).	Capturing	the	language,	
look, and feel of these early Internet ventures, the BPA offers a valuable 
research context for scholars interested in exploring this period.
Contributions to the Business Plan Archive have come from two 
sources: individual entrepreneurs and private equity investors. Individual 
entrepreneurs have tended to contribute planning documents relating 
to the firm or firms they started, while investors have contributed larger 
batches of documents, subcollections ranging in size from tens to hun-
dreds and even thousands of records at a time. Because our objective was 
to look for the “blueprints” of Dot Com Era companies, business planning 
documents are defined broadly as any material that helps understand the 
assumptions, strategies, and tactics that underlie a startup. These materi-
als might include: brief executive summaries or PowerPoint presentations 
that entrepreneurs typically distributed widely to potential funders or 
partners;	full,	detailed	business	plans;	spreadsheets	or	other	financial	doc-
uments	that	were	distributed	with	the	business	plan;	and	related	memos,	
e-mails, screenshots, or published articles that shed light on startup strate-
gies.
To address possible bias in the sample arising from the open collection 
methodology, substantial effort has been made to establish the represen-
tativeness of the holdings. Focusing on specific subcollections submitted 
by single large investors, we demonstrated that the firms in our sample 
did not differ significantly from the overall population of firms seeking 
funding during and immediately following the Dot Com Era (Goldfarb, 
Kirsch, & Pfarrer, 2005). Exploiting the initial value of the records for 
social science rather than historical inquiry, research papers contributing 
to entrepreneurship, management, and finance have been published or 
are in press. Future users of the BPA will be able to refer to these early 
works as quasi-finding aids for the larger collection, and the expanded in-
formation about the BPA firms collected for these papers (i.e., outcome, 
entry and exit date, nature and extent of outside investors) enhances the 
ability of subsequent users to make additional contributions. Reporting 
on a 2007 paper in the Journal of Financial Economics (Goldfarb, Kirsch 
and Miller, 2007), the Wall Street Journal referred to the Digital Archive as 
“Smithsonian Institution of the Internet Bubble,” an accurate, if perhaps 
optimistic analogy (Gomes, 2006).
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Turning briefly to the contents of the Business Plan Archive, several 
observations are in order. First, the diversity of types of materials contrib-
uted was surprising. Based on prior research on venture capital funding 
of technology startups, our initial assumptions were that business plans 
are relatively stable artifacts with highly conserved structural elements 
and that every entrepreneur prepares and submits a similarly structured 
request when seeking funding. Analysis of the funding requests revealed 
much more variety: less than 40 percent of the companies submitted what 
we would call a formal business plan, and the plans themselves demon-
strated considerably variability. The average plan contained less than two-
thirds of the elements prescribed in typical entrepreneurship textbooks, 
and almost half did not explicitly indicate the amount of funding they 
were seeking, something we assume would be relatively important to a 
potential investor. Second, after exhaustive study, we were able to find 
little connection between the objective content of a business plan and the 
outcome of the proposed venture. In other words, it does not appear that 
good business plans lead to more successful ventures in any direct way 
that we could measure. Instead, we found that social ties more accurately 
predicted successful acquisition of venture funding, suggesting that at 
the margin, entrepreneurs should focus on building their social networks 
with potential investors rather than perfecting their written business plan. 
These findings—reported in a forthcoming paper in Strategic Management 
Journal (Kirsch, Golfarb, and Gera, forthcoming)—have far-reaching ped-
agogical implications for the way entrepreneurship is taught. Continuing 
research aims to extend these findings to look more broadly at the types 
of signals entrepreneurs send to potential investors (i.e., beyond simply 
submitting a business plan or reaching out through social networks).
Terms of access to the collection have varied. Initially, the site was open 
to the public, with donors able to control access rights themselves. It was 
hoped that the collection would develop on its own as more and more 
former Dot Com-Era entrepreneurs and investors learned of the oppor-
tunity to participate in the archival initiative. This Web 2.0 vision—first 
labeled “Open Source History” to reflect an inclusive, expansive notion 
akin to public history—has not proven successful. Of more than 110,000 
registered users of the Business Plan Archive website, no more than 100 
individuals have contributed to the collections, and the largest contribu-
tors have requested anonymity, thereby further confounding our initial 
open source vision. More than 4,600 users have registered from “.edu” 
addresses, indicating adoption within the target user community, and 
many faculty at schools where access to real business planning documents 
is limited have used the site to introduce students to this topic. It should 
be noted, however, that while the site was publicly available (from June 
2002—December 2007), the vast majority of users consulted it in search of 
a model business plan. This use, though not entirely unexpected, was not 
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part of the original vision for the site. In late 2007, we were contacted by a 
company whose business plan had been inadvertently distributed beyond 
the BPA to other public sites for this purpose. When the company threat-
ened legal action, university counsel recommended that we limit further 
public access, and since then, only approved researchers have been al-
lowed to use the archive records. Approved researchers are required to 
submit a research proposal that is reviewed by archive staff and sign an 
appropriate non-disclosure agreement. No legitimate requests have been 
turned down though less than fifty such requests have been received. The 
real risks attending unintended disclosures are limited (see discussion be-
low);	nevertheless,	program	staff	have	generally	concurred	with	counsel	
to err on the side of caution.
Brobeck Closed Archive
The opportunities and legal entanglements associated with the Business 
Plan Archive pale by comparison to the next important collection in the 
digital archive: the Brobeck Closed Archive (hereafter, Brobeck Archive 
or Closed Archive).
Brobeck, Phleger, & Harrison was a San Francisco law firm founded in 
1926. By 2001, it had become regarded as one of the top two Silicon Val-
ley firms representing newly emerging dot com ventures, as well as estab-
lished corporations such as Cisco, Sun Microsystems, and Nokia. Brobeck 
expanded heavily during this period, serving thousands of technology 
clients and incurring upward of $100 million in debt that (among other 
causes) would result in its dissolution in February 2003 and subsequent 
filing for bankruptcy protection (September 2007). Over the course of its 
seventy-seven years, Brobeck amassed a fortune of historical client records, 
both in paper and, later, in digital format. Upon Brobeck’s dissolution, 
the firm’s Liquidation Committee asked a third-party vendor (Gallivan, 
Gallivan, & O’Melia, a leading electronic discovery consulting firm) to 
make a digital backup of the firm’s entire network, which former Brobeck 
partners and clients then used to retrieve their records. The backup con-
tains a diverse range of client data, as well as information related strictly 
to the administration of the partnership—minutes of partner meetings, 
operating and financial information about the firm, billing and account-
ing records, and other digital ephemera.
Brobeck represented several thousand technology companies during 
the 1990s. Given the focus of the larger digital archive on the activities of 
firms founded in this period to commercialize the Internet, we believed 
that the Brobeck corpus would include the records of many hundreds of 
target firms and set out to explore the possibility of preserving the Brobeck 
records as part of the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era.
When first contacted about the Brobeck Archive, many casual observ-
ers dismissed the effort as a lost cause. How, they wondered, could we save 
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materials that retained legal privilege and confidentiality without abrogat-
ing those rights? Some went further: Even if we could save some of the 
Brobeck records, what good would they do? To whom would the records 
be of any legitimate interest? Indeed, our initial approach was agnostic on 
these questions. Far from being convinced that preserving the records of 
the failed law firm was necessarily a good idea, we embarked on the first 
phase of the project with an experimental orientation: What should hap-
pen to entrained records when a failing law firm represented hundreds if 
not thousands of failed clients? Who is the party responsible for managing 
records when the responsible party, the law firm itself, fails?
While the Business Plan Archive was initially conceived and imple-
mented at the University of Maryland, the Brobeck Archive required we 
engage the larger community of digital preservation, including the Cen-
ter for History and New Media at George Mason University (http://chnm 
.gmu.edu), the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preserva-
tion Program of the Library of Congress (http://www.digitalpreservation 
.gov), the Estate of the failed law firm, Gallivan, Gallivan, & O’Melia 
(http://www.digitalwarroom.com), and a blue-ribbon advisory council 
including experts in privilege, confidentiality, legal ethics, bankruptcy, 
venture law, and the management of data enclaves.
Within a year of launching the exploratory phase of the Brobeck ef-
fort, project staff concluded that the records could be saved, but access 
to and disclosure of the contents would need to be carefully controlled. 
Because the Supreme Court has held that privilege and confidentiality 
are perpetual, the permanent repository must preserve the underlying 
rights inhering in the legal records. In effect the existence of a perma-
nent repository will maintain these rights by acting as if the firm had not 
failed. Most fundamentally, we believe that clients never had any reason-
able expectation that their records would be destroyed—only that they 
would be shielded from public disclosure. In fact, most law firms (includ-
ing Brobeck) have policies requiring client records to be kept indefinitely, 
even (and often especially) if clients request they be destroyed. Brobeck’s 
dissolution interrupted this indefinite preservation, and our designated 
archive will respect confidentiality by preserving client records in the same 
manner as did Brobeck. Appointing an indefinite third-party repository 
for confidential materials is accepted practice in the medical community, 
where bankrupt private practices have named local hospitals as reposito-
ries for patient records. The result of this philosophy is a closed archive 
that preserves information but has no interest in providing access. Rather, 
the proposed closed archive will have arrangements with traditional ar-
chival institutions, to which it will forward documents no longer in need 
of confidentiality protections. Examples of such situations are (a) after 
receiving	the	consent	of	a	former	client;	(b)	after	making	a	specific	de-
termination	that	a	document	was	never	confidential;	(c)	aggregated	sta-
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tistical	data;	or	 (d)	after	 changes	 in	 the	applicable	 confidentiality	 laws.	
Authenticity, provenance, and other basic archival issues are thus overlaid 
on an underlying set of client rights (confidentiality and privilege, not to 
mention basic property rights like copyright), third-party rights (privacy 
of contract), and obligations to observe the rules of ethics that govern le-
gal practice. Archivists are already familiar with various manifestations of 
these	issues;	however,	the	Brobeck	Archive,	like	the	Business	Plan	Archive	
poses several novel challenges that continue to occupy project staff.
These challenges are reflected in the court order that officially sanc-
tioned the creation of the Brobeck Closed Archive. On August 9, 2006, 
in recognition of the extraordinary efforts of the project team and the 
historic nature of the Brobeck records, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Divi-
sion, authorized the creation of a Closed Archive allowing a large subset of 
these records to be preserved at the direction of the Library of Congress.1 
The court approved a high-level set of principles—the “Closed Archive 
Methodology”—that establishes the guidelines under which the Brobeck 
Closed Archive will operate. Certain categories of records, which we have 
no expectation to ever have reason or right to access, will be separated 
from the collection and destroyed (see fig. 1). For finer grained distinc-
tions among different types of client and law firm records, general bank-
ruptcy practice was followed. We were required to privately and publicly 
notice all parties of the expected creation of the Closed Archive. However, 
rather than requiring former clients and other rights holders to “opt in” 
to an open archive, the methodology instead allows rights holders to “opt 
out” (at any time) but assumes that many clients will not be able to respond 
and therefore impounds all remaining materials in the Closed Archive 
and places strict limits on access to and disclosure of specific, attributable 
materials. This arrangement was necessitated by our desire to maintain 
the integrity of the overall corpus and the fact that so many of the rights 
holders had ceased to exist. Indeed, the project mailed out approximately 
11,000	copies	of	the	court	notice;	more	than	3,400	(30	percent)	were	re-
turned as “undeliverable,” implying that this subset of former clients may 
not have received the intended notice. For the sake of comparison, had 
Judge Montali limited the collection to those clients who opted in, we 
would today have open access to the records of less than fifteen clients.
We also recognized that even if the bulk of the Brobeck Archive would 
need to remain off-limits to historians, potentially into perpetuity, the 
scale and breadth of the collection could support social science research 
to answer a host of interesting questions without requiring that specific, 
confidential information be disclosed. The closed archive methodology 
approved by Judge Montali expressly envisions such research under an 
access model similar to that employed by the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus’ Research Data Centers. As with the Business Plan Archive, project 
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staff is working to establish the representativeness of the Brobeck Archive 
and account for any systematic distortions arising from the pattern of opt 
outs received (see fig. 2). Current plans call for the creation of an experi-
mental access site in 2008–9 to enable social science research. Under this 
model, access will be restricted to archivists or scholars who have signed 
strict non-disclosure agreements and whose proposals will have been vet-
ted by our advisory council. Initially, access will take place in an on-site, 
non-networked, institutional setting, and only for enumerated purposes. 
Archivists administering the Closed Archive will log search queries and 
document retrievals to ensure that users are complying with the narrow 
boundaries of their approved access and will only allow aggregated or 
redacted data to leave the secure area. We believe that this solution is 
workable and balances the need to safeguard confidentiality and privilege 
while still permitting approved scholarly access.
The data in the Brobeck Archive fall into a variety of technical types, 
which we have condensed into four categories. Figure 3 presents a graphi-
cal overview of these categories:
1.  Managed Documents. These are ordinary computer files (Word or Excel 
documents, etc.), which were centrally managed by Brobeck, such as 
attorney work product.
2.  Relational Databases. Databases were used by Brobeck to track files and fi-
nancial information such as billing records or client contact information.
Figure 1.  Closed Archive Classifications
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3.  Microsoft Outlook Data. These objects are Personal Storage Table (PST) 
files containing employees’ e-mail and calendars.
4.  Network Share Drives. These are personal storage areas that allowed em-
ployees to store files that were not centrally managed by Brobeck.
The Brobeck records offer rare glimpses into the world of high-tech 
entrepreneurship that produced the Internet revolution. The collections 
also offer the opportunity to preserve sensitive, “at risk,” born digital ar-
chival materials while preserving the privacy and confidentiality interests 
of the parties involved. Recently, multiple organizations have made un-
welcome news for their failure to adequately protect confidential personal 
information and/or respect limits of personal privacy. The Brobeck cor-
pus offers an opportunity to develop, test, and evaluate potential techni-
cal and institutional solutions necessary for the creation of a functioning 
closed archive. Though initial efforts have yielded promising results that 
do not risk disclosure of confidential information (Goldfarb et al., 2008), 
in general, the approved methodology must still be translated into operat-
ing guidelines and procedures that will govern the operation of the closed 
archive in years to come.
Dot Com Archive and Related Firm-level Collections
The third component of the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com 
Era includes additional holdings that capture the experiences of indi-
vidual Dot Com-Era workers and the detailed records of individual firms 
Figure 2.  Initial Impact of “Opt Out” on Overall Brobeck Corpus, by Matter Type
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whose founders (or their successors) donated collections to the archive. 
Firms whose records have been collected in this manner include Scient 
Corp., Broadband Sports, and OneSoft. These collections more closely 
approximate traditional business archives in as much as the preserved 
materials reflect the position(s) of the donor(s) and other collection-
specific biases. Significantly, all of the major parts of this collection come 
from failed firms, a seeming fluke that may portend greater changes in 
the archival landscape that are discussed below.
Taken together the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era 
includes more than 6.4 million characterized digital objects, ranging from 
multi-gigabyte databases to individual e-mails and memos. Because the 
Brobeck collection is the largest single subcollection and because manag-
ing the rights associated with these materials is especially complicated, our 
initial efforts have focused on figuring out how to preserve these confi-
dential legal materials. The Digital Archive permits systematic exploration 
of a host of new questions, requiring detailed, historically nonpublic data. 
These data provide a window into the Internet boom, an extraordinary 
period of technology entrepreneurship and industry creation. Under-
standing the dynamics of such episodes will help future generations learn 
to, at the very least, make new mistakes. Finally, the data enable scholarly 
conversations across multiple disciplines, some of which will converge to 
produce significant interdisciplinary knowledge. This confluence of fac-
tors is rare in archival and library science and underscores the scope of 
both the challenge and the opportunity before us.
Figure 3.  Categories of Records in the Brobeck Corpus Prior to Opt Out
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Conclusion: Codifying the Public Interest in  
Private Records
The concluding discussion reconsiders the relationship between the ini-
tial challenge and our response to date: Are we doing enough? Can we 
save the right types of business records in the emerging preservation re-
gime? What more can be done? By whom? What are the possible resulting 
scenarios?
In general the efforts described previously are mere baby steps. Even 
if we succeed in preserving every document and digital object on which 
we have set our sights, the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com 
Era will preserve only one tiny piece of the larger world of business his-
tory. Our efforts demonstrate only that some business records—from the 
Dot Com Era, from startup ventures, from failed companies, from clients 
represented by a huge bankrupt law firm—can be saved under certain, 
limited circumstances. But to be frank, since our project began, if the 
preservation outlook has improved in some quarters—geospatial data, 
Web harvesting, social science data sets, and many other domains that 
have been successfully transformed by the considered efforts of our digi-
tal preservation colleagues—the situation for business records is getting 
worse not better. Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, grow-
ing awareness of the immense costs of e-discovery, wider adoption of re-
cords retention schedules, and tighter control of the flow of information 
within firms are all pointing to the end of the Record of Business. As we 
charged forward, our destination receded, leaving us even further from 
the goal of being able to faithfully preserve a representative sample of 
born digital business records from the age of business ascendant than 
when we started. Yes, the Digital Archive of the Birth of the Dot Com Era is 
an existence proof: records can be saved. These collections are new types 
of scholarly objects that may eventually be as important and valuable as a 
fundamental scientific breakthrough or a new statistical technique. But it 
should not be this hard. It should not take an historic boom and bust to 
produce this preservation opportunity. Events such as we have recently 
seen are few and far between in the history of entrepreneurial capitalism 
and will not likely be repeated for decades. So the good news is that we 
have preserved an important set of materials from a singular moment in 
business history. The bad news is that we have not succeeded in changing 
the tilt of the preservation landscape. If we have won a battle, we seem less 
and less capable of winning the war.
Can we change the landscape? I suggest the answer is yes. At rock bot-
tom, the issue is the lack of recognized public interest in private records. 
The only real solution, therefore, is to establish such an interest. Congress 
can and should create it. According to the same logic by which we enjoy 
the benefits of the National Register of Historic Places, there should be 
a mechanism by which a firm can ask a public body to acknowledge the 
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broader value of its private records, place such records in public hands 
and thence be inoculated against further private costs—discovery, litiga-
tion, etc.—arising from the fact that the records were not destroyed.
In the end, firms are composed of people, and in general, few people 
lack the ability to see value in history. The risks that firms possessing po-
tentially interesting historical records are trying to insure against have the 
following attributes: they are unknowable ex-ante;	there	is	a	low	probabil-
ity	that	they	will	occur;	and	they	have	likely	low	but	ultimately	unknown	
costs. Here is where we see the confluence of the factors described at the 
outset.
The entrepreneurial economy naturally tends to disperse archival re-
cords. Failed companies leave few traces and complicated, sometimes con-
flicting, lines of archival provenance. For instance, the individual author 
of a business plan may own the copyright to the plan because he or she 
wrote it before the company it proposed to establish was created. Months 
or years later, when the company it described ceases to exist, the assets of 
the firm may be assigned for sale, liquidated in bankruptcy or even aban-
doned, but who owns the copyright to the business plan? Who owns the 
intellectual property described in the plan that was subsequently assigned 
to the company, developed to a further degree and then failed? The case 
of a failed firm in the Brobeck Archive is even more complicated. If a 
dutiful researcher wants to obtain consent to examine the records of a 
failed venture, whose permission does he need: The entrepreneur who 
lost the company when his or her investors lost confidence and removed 
the founder from active management? The investors who liquidated the 
company, selling bits and pieces for salvage? The individual employees 
whose private e-mails are embarrassingly but incidentally entrained in the 
preserved records? Or the lawyer whose firm failed, effectively abandon-
ing the records on a street corner? None of these agents has acquitted 
themselves with honor. The organization itself—the properly responsible 
entity—no longer exists, but according to the Supreme Court, its privi-
lege and confidentiality are perpetual. The records of the entrepreneurial 
economy are thus orphan records of a sort. Managing the risks associated 
with other types of orphan works has shown signs of progress in recent 
years. Thus, maybe there is hope for business records too.
In some circles, critics have conjured the specter of a “Digital Dark Age” 
to describe the weak regime for the preservation of cultural materials in 
the	transition	from	the	pre-digital	to	the	digital	age	(Kuny,	1998;	Rosenz-
weig, 2003). As valuable, born-digital cultural resources slip through and 
around the pre-digital preservation network, new institutions dedicated 
to cultural preservation are adapting to meet the challenge. Other con-
tributors	to	this	volume	represent	a	cross-section	of	these	efforts;	scholars	
and the public alike can take great satisfaction in the vision and breadth 
of these initiatives. Under the good auspices of the National Digital Infor-
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mation Infrastructure Preservation Program of the Library of Congress, 
the National Science Foundation, and a host of other forward-looking 
organizations, archivists, and librarians are waging an under-resourced, 
rear guard action to keep the technological horizon in sight, if not quite 
at hand. In the few years since these efforts commenced, multiple techno-
logical shocks—YouTube, Google Maps, MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, to 
name just a few—have forced participants to adapt to this changing land-
scape, and the expanding network of partners catalyzed by the Library of 
Congress (and others) has done just that. In general, I am much less wor-
ried today about the advent of a digital dark age than I was several years 
ago when these initiatives were conceived and launched.
However, in the area of digital business records, this article has ad-
vanced a more troubling possibility. Despite the best efforts of the com-
munity of archivists and librarians to preserve representative and valuable 
subsets of digital culture, the Record of Business is at risk of loss for the 
very reason that other categories of born-digital records may yet be pre-
served: because the records have value. As businesses increasingly dis-
cover the value of their own records, practicing what researchers and 
consultants have come to refer to as knowledge management, organizations 
are dedicating more and more resources to records maintenance and 
management. In the short term, where paper records might have been 
haphazardly managed in the past, expanded digital records are now being 
actively curated and exploited by progressive managers. ERP, CRM, and 
other data-intensive management systems have increased the efficiency of 
supply chains (SAP), sales and customer management (Salesforce.com), 
IT resource planning (VMWare), and other critical corporate functions. 
In each instance, previously diffuse data of unknown economic value are 
gathered, ordered, and packaged to support core business activities. The 
increased value of data justifies increased investment in data management, 
extending the primary use phase of the data lifecycle.
In a brief number of years, the transformation will be complete. Busi-
ness records will have gone from loosely managed collections that are 
weakly and haphazardly persistent in paper to highly structured and ac-
tively managed but ephemeral databases of ones and zeroes. This process 
(threat) has been identified in other (i.e., nonbusiness) settings, where it 
is associated with incidental loss due to the technical and institutional chal-
lenges of digital preservation. The digital challenge is real and should not 
be underestimated. Understanding the multiple dimensions along which 
the digital transformation strains existing institutional mechanisms will 
require the goodwill and coordinated efforts of multiple, overlapping sets 
of participants and stakeholders. In the domain of business, however, the 
situation is different. Here, the challenge is not that records will succumb 
to incidental loss. Rather, the risk is that there is a class of records that will 
be lost to human history in its entirety. The Record of Business will be lost 
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not by accident, but on purpose and in full view of relevant stakeholders, 
shareholders, and other fiduciaries. Yeah, shareholders should cheer as 
these records are actively destroyed.
Alternatively, the sanitized subset of records that are actively preserved 
will resemble a representative sampling of the past in the same way that 
letters to shareholders from CEOs published in annual reports of public 
corporations satisfactorily describe the historical activities of that corpora-
tion during a given year or period, which is to say, not at all. The record 
of business in this view will be the same puerile, pre-chewed and strained, 
massaged, PR-processed view of events that currently pass for sense-mak-
ing in the executive suite.
Business has never been more central to American society than it is to-
day. Paradoxically, unless a new social contract is forged between business 
and society, upon which a preservation regime can be established to save 
important business records, we will have no pathways by which to under-
stand the triumph of business.
Notes
1.  Speaking from the bench, Judge Montali began, “First of all, let me complement the 
Trustee and you, Ms. Borrey, and all the people you’ve been working for, for a very, 
very comprehensive and, you know, well thought out and well conceived approach to 
this problem, a unique problem.” For full transcript of court session, see http://www.
brobeckclosedarchive.org.
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